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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(1)

Nature of the Case:
Western Home Transport, Inc., (hereinafter "Appellant") appeals the Industrial

Commission's (hereinafter "Commission") Decision and Order that the remuneration
Appellant paid to its drivers who transported mobile homes for Appellant's customers
was wages for services performed in covered employment for Idaho unemployment
insurance purposes.
(2)

Course of the Proceedings Below:
The

Idaho

Department

of Labor

(hereinafter

"Department")

issued

a

redetermination on September 23, 2011, concluding that remuneration paid by Appellant
to its interstate transport drivers for work performed from January 1, 2008 through
December 31, 2010 was wages for services performed in covered employment. Exhibit
3. Appellant filed a timely appeal on October 5, 2011. Exhibit 4. On May 16, 2012, the
Department's Appeals Examiner held a hearing where all parties were represented by
legal counsel. Exhibit 1. On June 4, 2012, the Department's Appeals Examiner issued a
decision affirming the Department's redetermination. R. pp. 1-12.
On June 18, 2012, Appellant filed a timely appeal of the decision to the
Commission. R. pp. 13-17. After a de nova review of the record, the Commission issued
its Decision and Order on October 2, 2012, affirming the Appeals Examiner's decision.

R. pp. 22-37. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to this Court on November 1,
2012. R. pp. 38-40.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

1

(3)

Statement of Facts:
Appellant is an Idaho corporation engaged in the business of providing the

interstate transport of manufactured homes and modular buildings. Tr. p. 11, L. 25; p. 12,
L. 1; p. 209, Ll. 10-11. In order to engage in interstate transport, a business must first

obtain a Motor Canier (MC) number issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation and a U.S. Depm1ment of
Transp011ation (DOT) number also issued by the United States Depai1ment of
Transportation. Tr. p. 13, LL 18-25; p. 14, LL 5-12.
Appellant's interstate transport drivers owned their trucks and leased them to
Appellant. Tr. p. 28, LI. l-3. As a result of the lease agreements, Appellant acquired the
exclusive possession, control and use of the trucks. Exhibit 7; Tr. p. 21, LI. 15-19; p. 22,

Ll. 7-8; p. 74, LI. 3-5; p. 135, LL 24-25; p. 136, L. l; p. 245, LI. 18-22; p. 275, LI. 6-25;

P. 276, LL 1-6. Appellant did not operate any trucks under its MC/DOT authority that
were not leased from Appellant's drivers. Tr. p. 28, LL 1-3; p. 214, LL 18-23: p. 218, Ll.
23-25; p. 259, LL 17-22. The lease agreements drafted by Appellant were for a tenn of
thiity days and then continued month to month until terminated at will by either party.
Exhibit 7.
Appellant covered all of its interstate transport drivers with Appellant's MC/DOT
authority. Tr. p. 87, LI. 14-22; p. 193, Ll. 9-19; p. 259. LL 14-16. As a result, Appellant
required its drivers to place decals on the sides of its leased trucks signifying to
authorities that the trucks were being operated under Appellant's MC/DOT authority. Tr.
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p. 253, LL 21-25: p. 254, LL 1-7. Appellant identified each truck by a fleet number it
assigned. Tr. p. 91, LL 9-21. The insurance identification cards only identified Appellant
as the insured. Exhibit I: Tr. p. 166. LL 24-25; p. 167, L. 1. The required insurance
identified each truck by the unit number assigned by Appellant. Tr. p. 16 7, LL 4-13.
Appellant's drivers could not drive the trucks for anyone else while the trncks were
leased to Appellant and displayed Appellant's MC/DOT decals. Tr. p. 203, LL 6-25; p.
204, LL 1-19. Appellant required its drivers to maintain daily contact and to obtain
Appellant's wTitten authorization before transporting any commodity. Exhibit 7; Tr. p.
251, LL 10-13; p. 260, Ll. 18-25.
Appellant acknowledged that having MC/DOT authority over the interstate
operation of the leased trucks gave it the inherent right to direct and control the details of
the work Tr. p. 245, LL 11-14. Appellant's interstate transport drivers could not assign
someone else to make the transport. Tr. p. 263, LI. 6-8
Appellant's drivers obtained their own commercial driver's license and covered
their own expenses for medical exams and drug tests. Tr. p. 73, LL 17-19; p. 173, Ll. 1314. They also maintained and repaired their trucks. Tr. p. 73, LI. 6-16; p. l

LL 19-25;

p. 173, LL 1-7. Because Appellant was legally responsible for the safety of the trucks,
Appellant required its drivers to attend safety meetings. Tr. p. 31, LL 3-5; p. 265, LL 2325; p. 266, Ll. 1-2. Appellant, and not its interstate transport drivers, would be cited for
any DOT safety violations. Tr. p. 259, LL 2-4; p. 267, LI. 23-25. Appellant could lose its
MC/DOT authority based on the conduct of its drivers. Tr. p. 266, Ll. 3-5. Because
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Appellant's MC/DOT authority and liability were at stake if Appellanf s drivers did not
properly maintain their trucks, drivers would

fired if their trucks were not properly

maintained. Tr. p. 30. LL 20-25; p. 31, LI. I
Appellant did not withhold taxes or provide benefits for its drivers. Tr. p. 32, LI.
11-22.

Appellant paid its drivers a percentage of each load.

LL 21-25.

Tr. p.

Appellant loaded the driver's payment onto a comdata card set up by Appellant. Tr. p.
85, Ll. 14-21; p. 189, LL 9-25. Appellant provided advances to its drivers to allow them
to pay for fuel costs and road taxes. Exhibit

Tr. p. 22. Ll. 1-4; p. 32, Ll. 17-20: p. 261,

LI. 9-18; p. 269, LL 16-1 7. Without the advances. Appellant's drivers could not afford to
front the funds necessary to cover them. Tr. p. 32, LI. 11-20. Appellant also reimbursed
the drivers for fuel surcharge costs. Tr. p. 182, LI. 4-6; p. 187, LL

10. Appellant

audited and recorded fuel purchased by its drivers and filed International Fuel Tax
Agreement (IFTA) repo1is with the State Tax Commission.
Appellant obtained all the necessary insurance

Tr. p. 261, Ll. 9-18.

Appellant's name, writing the check to

the insurance company and then passing the cost onto its drivers. Exhibit

Tr. p. 28, LI.

9-21; p. 89, Ll. 10-25; p. 90, Ll. 1-2: p. 94, LL 23-25: p. 95, Ll. 1-4; p. I

LI. 2-11; p.

224, LI. 1-13; p.

LL 8-11.

Appellant required its drivers to maintain an escrow

account with a minimum balance of $300 to cover insurance premiums.

Exhibit 7.

Appellant reimbursed the drivers the cost of hiring a pilot car when the driver turned in
the freight bill. Tr. p. 76, Ll. 4-9; p. 186, LI. 1

; p. 187, Ll. 1-15. Appellant reviewed

the driving record of each driver before it ordered drivers' licenses. Tr. p.
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LI. 7-14.

Appellant hauled oversized loads where special trip pennits and routes of travel
were required. Tr. p. 237, LI. 14-18. The State ofidaho required Appellant to verify its
MC/DOT authority and insurance coverage in order to obtain a permit. Tr. p. 271, LL 56.

Appellant paid for the trip pennits and billed their cost directly to Appellant's

customers. Tr. p. 270, LL 19-23,

Appellant made all arrangements for the loads and

provided all the transport jobs to its drivers. Tr. p. 259, LL 5-8. Appellant's name was
on all the paperwork at the ports of entry, on freight bills and on bills of lading. Tr. p.
259, LL 9-16. Appellant created the price quotes for its transport services. Tr. p. 230, LI.
23-25; p. 231, LL 1-9. Appellant was required to complete all bills of lading and freight
billings before its driver could transport under Appellants MC/DOT authority. Tr. p. 259,
LI. 5-15; p. 267, LL 2-12. Appellant had the exclusive possession, control and use of the
equipment preventing its drivers from going "willy nilly out and haul[ing] someone else's
product without our [Appellant's] freight bill and our papers ... " Exhibit 7; Tr. p. 275,
Ll. 11-25; p. 276, Ll. 1-6. Appellant classified all drivers as independent contractors and
the Department reclassified them as employees. Exhibit 3. Tr. p. 219, LL 1-8.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
L

Should the Court follow the principle of stare decisis and apply controlling
precedent that truck drivers operating solely under another's federal motor carrier and
U.S. Department of Transportation authority were not, and legally could not be,
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independently established in their o\vn interstate transportation business for purposes of
Idaho's Employment Security Law?

II.
Is there substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial
Commission's findings and conclusions that the drivers were as a matter of law
employees and not independent contractors?

III.
Should attorney fees and costs be awarded to the Department in an appeal from an
administrative proceeding?

ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
In proceedings involving tax liability under the Employment Security Law, the
provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code,
regarding contested cases and judicial review of contested cases, are not applicable.
Idaho Code§ 72-1361.
In appeals from decisions of the Industrial Commission, the Court's review is
limited to questions of law. Idaho Constitution, Article V, § 9; Pimley v. Best Values,

Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 434, 974 P2d 78, 80 (1999). This Court does not reweigh the
evidence or consider \Vhether it would have reached a different conclusion. Ginther v.

Boise Cascade Corporation, 150 Idaho 143, 147, 244 P.3d 1229, 1233 (2010). While
conflicting evidence may exist in the record, the Court will not disturb the Commission's
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factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.

Id.

The factual findings of the

Commission will be upheld provided they are supported by substantial and competent
evidence.

Uhl v. Ballard A1edical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265,

1269 (2003). "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion." Id. "Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Painter v. Potlach Corporation, 138
Idaho 309, 312, 63 P.2d 435, 438 (2003), citing Zapata v. JR. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513,
515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). In reviewing a decision of the Commission, the Court
views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed
before the Commission. Ginther v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 150 Idaho at 147, 244
P.3d at 1233.

ARGUMENT

I.
The principal of stare decisis requires controlling precedent be followed
that truck drivers operating solely under another's federal motor carrier
and U.S. Department of Transportation authoritv were not, and legally
could not be, independently established in their own interstate
transportation business for purposes of Idaho's Employment Security
Law.

There is simply no new principal of law that requires this Court to overturn its
prior decision in Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor, 145 Idaho
415, 179 P. 3d 1071 (2008). This Court has repeatedly held that controlling precedent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

7

will not be ovenuled "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate the plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy a continued injustice." State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657,
660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,
77, 803 P2d 978, 983 (1990). See also, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1010, 842 P.2d
660, 680 (1992), Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998)
and State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005).
The record in this case establishes that Appellant's interstate transportation
drivers drove under Appellant's MC/DOT authority. TL p. 87, LL 14-22; p. 193, LL 919: p. 259, LL 14-16. Federal MC authority is the legal operating authority that allows
the transportation of non-exempt goods across state lines.

Tr. p. 13, LL 18-25.

An

interstate transportation company's federal DOT number is a unique identifier used for
collecting and monitoring a company's safety information. Tr. p. 14, Ll. 1-12. Both the
MC authority and the DOT number are issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. Tr. p. 13, LL 16-25.
By federal law, a business cannot operate as a motor carrier without registering
with the U.S. Secretary of Transportation. See 49 U.S.C. § 13901.

The Secretary's

registration requires motor carriers to comply with federal statutes and regulations
governing the interstate transportation of goods and imposes minimum financial
responsibility on motor carriers for personal or property damage caused by a motor
carrier's negligent operation, maintenance or use of the motor carrier's vehicles. See 49
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U.S.C. § 13902(a)(l ). As a registered motor carrier vvith MC/DOT authority, Appellant
acknowledged that it could lose its authority

to

operate an interstate transportation

business should Appellant's drivers operating under its MC/DOT authority fail to comply
with the requirements of the federal motor carrier law and regulations. TL p. 30, LL 2025; p. 31, LL 1-5: p. 259, LL 2-4; p. 265, LL 23-25; p. 266, LL 1-5; p. 267, LI. 23-25.
The appellant in Giltner was an interstate transportation company that engaged
owner/operator drivers who were paid a percentage of each load. Giltner, 145 Idaho at
418, 179 P. 3d at 1074.

Each owner/operator driver entered into a "Contractor

Operating/Lease Agreement" and an "Equipment Lease Agreement" with Giltner.

Giltner, 145 Idaho at 418, 179 P. 3d at 1074. In analyzing the second "independently
established" prong of the Department's statutory independent contractor test, this Court
noted that Giltner's owner/operator drivers were dependent on Giltner's DOT authority to
haul goods interstate and had no independent authority to operate without Giltner's DOT
authority. Idaho Code§ 72-1316(4)(b) and Giltner, 145 Idaho at 420, 179 P. 3d at 1076.
Therefore, this Court held, as a matter oflaw, that Giltner's owner/operator drivers could
not be engaged in their own independently established interstate transportation business
for purposes ofidaho's Employment Security Law. Giltner, 145 Idaho at 420, 179 P. 3d
at 1076.
In this case, Appellant is also a transportation company providing the interstate
transportation of manufactured homes and modular buildings. Tr. p. 11, L. 25; p. 12, L.
1; p. 209, LL 10-11. Appellant engaged drivers and paid them a percentage of the income
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it received from the loads they delivered. Tr. p. 28, LI. 1-3. Appellant did not have any
trucks of its own and leased the trucks it operated from its interstate transportation
drivers. Tr. p. 28, LL 1-6; p. 214, LL 18-23; p. 218, LL 23-25; p. 219, LI. 1-8; p. 259, LI.
J 7-22.

Appellant entered into lease agreements it drafted with its drivers giving

Appellant the exclusive possession, control and use of each vehicle. Exhibit 7; Tr. p. 2 L
LI. 15-19; p. 22, LL 7-8; p. 74, LI. 3-5: p. 135, LL 24-25; p. 136, L. 1; p. 245, LI. 18-22;
p. 275, LL 6-25; p. 276, Ll 1-6.

Appellant's drivers were required to drive a truck

identified with Appellant's MC/DOT authority. Exhibit 29; Tr. p. 13, LL 16-25; p. 14,
LL 5-12; p. 18, LI. 3-7; p. 34, LL 21-23; p. 259, LL 14-16. Appellant's drivers were
dependent on Appellant's MC/DOT authority to haul goods interstate.

Appellant

provided all the services that an independent contractor would otherwise provide like
bills of lading, trip permits, paperwork, fuel tax filings, insurance, accounting, advances
to cover upfront costs of fuel and its MC/DOT authority.

Appellant's interstate

transportation drivers testified that they did not have their own MC/DOT authority. Tr. p.
87, LL 14-22; p. 193, LL 14-25; p. 194, LL 1-4. Appellant's witness, Michael Byington
acknowledged that he was not independent. He testified:
I have to get my own authority and I don't know how to do that and if I
go totally independent I can't even afford to do that and I don't know and I don't know all the contacts and everything and -- you know.
Because I will go to some places that I don't even know they existed or
whatever.
Tr. p. 193, LL 24-25; p. 194, LL 1-4. Without their own MC/DOT authority, Appellant's
interstate transportation drivers were not, and legally could not have been, independently
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established in their own interstate transportation business.
Courts in various states have also found owner/operator drivers to be covered
employees for unemployment insurance purposes under facts similar to those in this case.
In Byrne Trucking Inc. v. Employment Division, 32 Or. App. 229, 574 P.2d 664, ajf'd,
284 Or. 443, 587 P.2d 473 (1978), Byrne engaged in interstate commerce, procured the
freight, collected the charges from shippers and its owner/operators paid all expenses,
chose their own routes, and controlled the method of loading. Byrne leased trucks from
its drivers. Bryne required its drivers to display its signage on their trucks and the trucks
were driven exclusively for Byrne. As in this case, Bryne's drivers had no business they
could sell apart from the value of the trucks. In Western Ports Transportation, Inc. v.

Employment Security Department, 10 Wash. App. 440, 41 P .3d 5 l 0 (2002), the court also
found that the owner/operators were employees under circumstances similar to Byrne.
The Supreme Court of New York in Claim ofShort, 233 A.D. 2d 676, 649 N.Y.S. 2d 955
(1996) found the owner/operators to be employees with facts similar to Byrne and

Western Ports Transportation.

See also, K&D Auto Body, Inc. v. Division of

Employment Security, 171 S. W. 3d 100 (2005).
Other courts have found owner/operators to be independent contractors and have
not seized upon MC/DOT authority as a determinative factor. Appellant argues that a
case cited by the Commission, A1erick Trucking Co. v. Missouri Department of Labor

and Industrial Relations, 933 S.W.2d 938 (1996), is nothing like the reiationship between
Appellant and its drivers. Unlike this case, the putative employer leased its trucks to its
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drivers and paid many of the costs that Appellant passed on to its drivers. A1erick, 933
S. W.2d at 941. However, the court in Merick found persuasive the fact that drivers were
entirely dependent on Merick's favor because it held the federal Interstate Commerce
Commission permit. Id. The Court noted in affirming the Commission below, that the
Commission "understood the economic reality that the drivers were dependent on
Merick. Merick, 933 S.W.2d at 942. Although Merick paid for some of its driver's
expenses, its drivers could never have been independently established. "Merick handled
the billings, Merick could terminate the relationship at any time, and there was no
evidence that the drivers ever drove for another trucking firm." Aferick, 933 S.W.2d at
941.
Here as in Merick, Appellant's drivers were entirely dependent on Appellant's
MC/DOT authority. Appellant handled the billing and the drivers had virtually no
financial risk. Appellant prevented its drivers from going "willy nilly out and haul[ing]
someone else's product without our [Appellant's] freight bill and our papers .... " Tr. p.
275, LL 11-25; p. 276, LI. 1-6.

As in these cases, this Court in Giltner found the

MC/DOT authority to be distinctive and a driver's use of a third party's MC/DOT
authority for the interstate transportation of goods clearly means that that driver was not
and could not be independently established in the driver's own interstate transportation
business.
In Giltner, this Court specifically contrasted Hernandez v. Triple Ell Transport,
Inc., 145 Idaho 37, 175 P.3d 199 (2007). This Court noted that Hernandez had his own
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MC/DOT authority and the putative employer was merely his only client. Hernandez
could at any time have terminated his agreement and gone elsewhere to haul loads in
interstate commerce using his own MC/DOT authority. Giltner, 145 Idaho at 420, 179
P .3d at l 076. Also distinguishable for this same reason is Hammond v. Department of
Employment, 94 Idaho 66, 480 P.2d 912 (1971).

Like Mr. Hernandez, the drivers in

Hammond did not drive under the putative employer's MC/DOT authority. The case of
National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Employment Security Agency of Idaho, 83 Idaho 247,
360 P.2d 994 (1961), can also be distinguished because at the time this Court issued its
ruling in National Trailer, the test to determine an independent contractor's exemption
from covered employment did not require that workers be independently established in
their own business. Instead, National Trailer was decided using the common law test.
Further, the statutory employee status of owner/operator drivers is well
established. For purposes of preventing motor carriers from evading responsibility for
accidents caused by its owner/operator drivers, courts have found owner/operators to be
the statutory employees of the business entity legally responsible for complying with the
DOT regulations governing the use of the driver's vehicles. Zamalloa v. Hart, 31 F. 3d
911 (9 1h Cir. 1994).
The record m this case establishes that Appellant's interstate transportation
drivers drove under Appellant's MC/DOT authority. Tr. p. 87, LL 14-22; p. 193, LL 919; p. 259, LL 14-16. Consequently, it was legally impossible for Appellant's drivers to
be independently established in their own interstate transportation business. Therefore,
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the Commission's decision that Appellant's interstate transportation drivers were
Appellant's employees for purposes of Idaho's Employment Security Law should be
affirmed.
Appellant's simple assertion that this Court should reconsider its prior ruling
ignores the principle of stare decisis.

Recognizing that our judicial system needs to

respect the rule of law and provide predictability and continuity over time, this Court has
stated that having previously decided an issue, with no new basis upon which to
reconsider the issue, it would be guided by the principle of stare dee is is and adhere to the
law as already expressed by the Court. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d
801, 805 (1994). Appellant has not provided any argument to show that Giltner was
manifestly vvrrong, unwise, or unjust or that overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Appellant has simply shown
that the law is inconvenient and does not fit within its style of conducting its interstate
transportation business.

II.
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the
Industrial Commission's findings and conclusions that the drivers were as
a matter oflaw employees and not independent contractors as held in
Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor.
The Idaho Legislature, finding economic insecurity due to unemployment a
serious threat to the well-being of Idahoans, enacted Idaho's Employment Security Law
to encourage employers to offer stable employment and to pay benefits during periods of
unemployment. Idaho Code § 72-1302. This Court has held that Idaho's Employment
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Security Law should be construed liberally to effectuate that purpose.

Davenport v.

State, Department of Employment, 103 Idaho 492, 494, 650 P.2d 634, 636 (1982).

Under Idaho's Employment Security Law, "covered employers" are required to
pay contributions to the employment security fund based on wages paid employees for
services rendered in "covered employment." King v. Department of Employment, 110
Idaho 312, 313, 715 P.2d 983 (1986). The law imposes an obligation on employers to
report wages paid for "covered employment" and to pay unemployment insurance taxes
based upon the reported payroll.
The law defines "covered employment" as "an individual's entire service
performed by him for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or
implied." Idaho Code § 72-1316.

Idaho Code § 72-1328 defines wages as "all

remuneration for personal services from whatever source, including commissions and
bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash." It is
undisputed that Appellant paid its owner/operator driver a percentage of the loads they
hauled. Tr. p. 75, LI. 21-25. By definition, this remuneration constitutes "wages" paid to
the drivers.
In Software Associates, Inc. v. State of Idaho, Department of Employment, 110
Idaho 315, 715 P.2d 985 (1986), the Supreme Court explained that "the term 'covered
employment' as used in the Employment Security Act is an expansive term, 'sweeping
within its purview employees and independent contractors alike." Id. at 316, 715 P .2d at
986, (citing King v. Dept. of Employment, 110 Idaho 312, 715 P.2d 982 (1986)). To
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escape from this broad, expansive net of "covered employment," a putative employer
must "exempt out" of covered employment by demonstrating that it qualifies for the
statutory exemption for independent contractors.

Id.

In Software Associates, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed that the statutory exemption for independent contractors is "to
be narrowly construed." Id. (emphasis added); see also Branchjlower v. Department of
Employn1ent, 128 Idaho 593, 597, 947 P.2d 750, 754 (1996) ("[W]hen the Court

construes taxing statutes and most remedial legislation, exemptions from coverage should
be narrowly construed.")
To that end, Idaho Code§ 72-1316(4) presumes wages are received for services in
covered employment unless the employer proves:
(a)

That the worker has been and will continue to be free from control
or direction in the performance of his work, both under his contract
of service, and in fact; and,

(b)

That the worker is engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business.

(Emphasis added).
Idaho Code § 72-13 61 provides that the party appealing a determination of
coverage has the burden of "proving each issue appealed by clear and convincing
evidence." An employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the services
provided by its workers satisfy both Idaho Code §§

1316(4)(a) and 72-1316(4)(b) to

demonstrate the services do not constitute "covered employment." See IDAPA Rule
09.0L35.112.05 (A worker who meets one but not both of the tests shall be found to
perform services in covered employment.)
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There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the finding of
the Industrial Commission that Appellant did not demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that its owner/operator drivers were engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, profession or business. Appellant's drivers drove under Appellant's
MC/DOT authority.

Without the drivers' ovvn MC/DOT authority, they could not

independently operate their own interstate transportation business. One of Appellant's
drivers admitted that he could not afford to be totally independent and that he did not
have the contacts to do so. Tr. p. 193, LL 24-25; p. 194, LL 1-4. The only way for
Appellant's drivers to survive economically was to work under Appellanfs MC/DOT
authority or the MC/DOT authority of someone else. Tr. p. 263, LL 3-5. There is no
evidence in the record that Appellant's drivers worked for anyone else. Appellant was
the sole facilitator for its driver's economic survival. Tr. p. 262, L 21. Without their
ovv11 MC/DOT authority, none of Appellant's owner/operator drivers were, or could have
been, independently established in their own interstate transportation business.
The Commission was bound to follow this Court's decision in Giltner as a matter
of law. While compliance with federal regulations does not demonstrate control, without
the statutory authority to work independently, a worker cannot be engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or business. The Commission's
decision to follow this Court's ruling in Giltner was supported by substantial and
competent evidence.

The Commission noted that this Court is not alone in its

determination that DOT authority is a linchpin in commercial transportation cases
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involving the assessment of the covered employment relationship. This Court's ruling in
Giltner is binding on the Commission as a matter of law.
III.

The Idaho Department of Labor is entitled to attorney foes and costs on
appeal.
Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 (a)
and Idaho Code § 12-117. Appellant has provided no substantive evidence Giltner was
manifestly wrong, unwise, or unjust or that overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice, therefore, the Department
should be entitled to attorney fees in this matter.
CONCLUSION
There is no evidence that Giltner was manifestly wrong, unwise, or unjust or that
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice. There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support
the Industrial Commission's findings and conclusions that the drivers operating under
Appellant's MC/DOT authority were by operation of law employees. The Department
asks the Court to affirm the Commission's decision.
Respectfully submitted,
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